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I. Strategic options and the regulatory framework for digital 
markets1
Digital technologies, in particular the Internet, are transforming the world.
Indeed, advances in technology have not only drastically changed the way data 
are collected, processed, stored and used in social relations, but also entailed a new 
challenge to the European Union (hereinafter, “the EU”) in particular its legislators 
and regulators.
It then comes as no surprise that the European Commission has made of  the 
so-called “Digital Single Market Strategy”, launched in May 2015,2 one of  its political 
priorities.3
As initially defined by the Commission, the Strategy covers 16 specific measures 
based on three key pillars.
The aim is, firstly, to improve consumer access to digital goods and services 
throughout Europe by adopting rules on consumer protection, unjustified geo-
blocking,4 copyright and the VAT regime, or by identifying the main competitive 
concerns in this sector.5
Secondly, the Strategy aims at creating appropriate conditions for the 
development of  digital networks and innovative services by reviewing the rules 
on telecommunications and privacy in electronic communications, as well as by 
combating illegal content. 
The focus is, thirdly, on the optimization of  the growth potential of  the 
digital economy by promoting the free movement of  data, standardization and 
interoperability, as well as enhancing the digital skills of  citizens with a view to 
boosting employability.
It must be said that the European Commission succeeded in completing the 
main thrust of  its three pillars program in January 2017 and presented 35 legislative 
proposals and policy initiatives between May 2015 and January 2017.
A “mid-term review” of  the Strategy was published in May 2017 in which the 
Commission identified three broad areas where it considers that more vigorous 
action is needed at Union level.
More precisely:6
1. To promote the accessibility, movement and storage of  non-personal data in the 
European Union;7
2. To strengthen cybersecurity within the European Union;
1 I thank my associate and former legal secretary at the CJEU Carla Abrantes Farinhas for her valuable 
contribution to the preparation of  this paper.
2 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, “A Digital Single Market Strategy 
for Europe”, COM (2015) 192 final, 6 May 2015. See also the Institutional Report by Piedade Costa de 
Oliveira for the Topic I, “The Internal Market and the Digital Economy” of  the XXVIII FIDE Congress, 
Lisbon/Estoril, 23-26 May 2018, in special pp. 164-176.
3 This is one of  the 10 European Commission’s policy priorities foreseen in its Program for Employment, 
Growth, Equity and Democratic Change.
4 Geoblocking: when online consumers see their access to a website denied based on their location or 
are redirected to a local store with a different price.
5 The Commission launched a sectoral inquiry into competition in e-commerce in May 2015 to identify 
possible concerns in this area resulting from the businesses’ practices .
6 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1233_en.htm.
7 Non-personal data are outside the scope of  the General Regulation on Data Protection (GDPR), 
cited below.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2019
6 José Luís da Cruz Vilaça
3. To regulate the commercial practices of  online platforms and to ensure the prompt 
and effective removal of  illegal online content.
Among the milestones already achieved, the following are worthy of  note:
- The end of  roaming charges at the retail level, on June 15, 2017;8
- Cross-border portability of  online content services since the beginning of  2018;9
- The application, since May 2018, of  the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR); 10
- The adoption of  a regulation aimed at ending the unjustified geographical 
blockade from December 2018;11
- The presentation in April 2018 of  a proposal for a regulation on promoting 
fairness and transparency for business users of  online intermediation services.12
As can be seen, this is a broad and profound legislative and regulatory activity 
in a field of  decisive importance for strengthening the competitiveness of  the 
European economy in the context of  the global digital economy, designed to enable 
citizens and businesses in the EU to enjoy a set of  opportunities created by digital 
technology, while respecting the fundamental rights of  citizens.
II. The economic importance of the “Big Data” and the challenges 
and risks to the European economy, privacy and the individual 
rights of citizens
The value of  the European data economy is estimated to be around €739 billion 
in 2020, with the completion of  the Digital Single Market contributing €415 billion 
to the European economy, involving an additional growth of  €250 billion over the 
current Commission’s mandate, thus allowing hundreds of  thousands of  new jobs 
to be created.13
The long-term impact on GDP growth of  the digital economy reform efforts 
already undertaken was estimated at more than 1%, with additional reform efforts 
leading to additional GDP growth of  2.1%, which compares with about 0.27% of  
GDP of  benefits resulting from the current level of  cross-border e-commerce.14
8 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3241_pt.htm.
9 Regulation 2017/1128 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 June 2017 on cross-bor-
der portability of  online content services in the internal market, OJ L 168, 30.6.2017, p. 1-11.
10 Regulation 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016 on the pro-
tection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  
such data and repealing Directive 95/46 on the protection of  individuals with regard to the process-
ing of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data (General Regulation on Data Protection 
- RGPD), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88. This regulation is not specifically addressed to the digital sector, 
but is generally applicable to activities subject to Union law, with the exception of  Title V, Chapter 2, 
of  the EU Treaty, relating to the common foreign and security policy. 
11 Regulation 2018/302 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  28 February 2018 aimed at 
preventing unjustified geographical blockade and other forms of  discrimination based on nationality, 
place of  residence or place of  establishment of  customers on the market amending Regulation No 
2006/2004 and 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22 - OJ L 60I, 2.3.2018, p. 1-15. 
12 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0238&fro-
m=EN.
13 See Jean-Claude Juncker, “Policy Guidelines for the Next European Commission - A New Beginning for Europe: My 
Program for Employment, Growth, Equity and Democratic Change”, July 15, 2014, available on: https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/publications/president-junckers-political-guidelines_en. 
14 See Commission Staff  Working Document, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and 
Evidence”, SWD (2015) 100 final, 6 May 2015.
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Every second, around the world, through smart phones, computers, unmanned 
vehicles and other types of  equipment, increasingly large amounts of  data from 
multiple sources – commonly called “Big Data” – are being generated. 
Finding the right balance between achieving the full potential of  the digital 
economy in terms of  innovation and economic growth on the one hand, and 
protecting the core values of  our liberal and democratic societies, on the other hand, 
has become a pressing issue for the various political actors and, in their field of  
action, the courts. That is why the transformation of  the digital economy creates 
major challenges for respect for the values on which the EU is founded – including 
democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of  law.
Recent developments show that one of  the most valuable assets in digital 
markets – the data – can be used to the detriment of  the protection of  privacy and 
family life, which are fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter 
and Article 16 (2) TFEU, which must be respected both by the institutions and 
bodies of  the Union and by the Member States when they are implementing Union 
law [Article 51 (1) of  the Charter].
Indeed, if  access to personal data is made available to third parties without 
the authorization of  the holders, the possibility of  accessing large amounts of  data 
opens the door to manipulation of  public opinion, which may even affect voters’ 
choices. Suffice it to mention, by way of  example, the various media episodes 
carried out by Facebook. The company has been harshly criticized for the hesitant 
and belated way that it managed the discovery of  suspicious Russian activity on the 
social network (which may have favoured Donald Trump’s election) or that it allowed 
the Cambridge Analytica company to have access to personal information about 
millions of  people.15 
 As the Financial Times recently reported on its front page, the personal data of  
500 million Starwood customers belonging to the Marriott International group dating 
back to 2004 may have been hacked! Ensuring that data is properly protected and not 
misused is essential to accomplishing the full potential of  the digital economy.
At the same time, the conditions under which modern markets are organised in 
the digital age change radically in nature, forcing market and competition regulators 
to adapt to the new business, transaction and communication models that the digital 
economy provides for.
III. Application of competition law in digital markets
Competition rules must be applied, in light of  the existing regulatory framework, 
in order to remedy market failures arising from the conduct of  undertakings that 
engage in collusive practices or abuse their dominant position, or which could, 
through an operation of  concentration, significantly impede effective competition 
in digital markets. Although, as Commissioner Margrethe Verstäger has pointed out 
on a number of  occasions, EU competition rules have the necessary plasticity to 
adapt to new realities, the speed with which digital markets have evolved and the high 
degree of  technicality that characterizes these markets make the application of  these 
15 See Sheera Frenkel, Nicholas Confessore, Cecilia Kang, Matthew Rosenberg and Jack Nicas, 
“Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis” The New York Times, November 
14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.
html.
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rules in the digital age especially complex.
The Commission’s Decisions in Google Shopping, 2017,16 and Google Android, 
2018,17 are particularly illustrative in this respect: in the first case, the Commission 
analysed about 1.7 billion surveys to assess how people behave online! These 
decisions are also impressive by the amount of  the fines imposed, which were € 2.45 
and € 4.34 billion respectively!
Those cases led some to claim the need to dismember, in the near future, the 
“giants” installed in the digital sector, companies like Google, Amazon or Facebook. 
The Economist recently published an excellent article entitled “The next capitalist 
revolution”,18 stressing the need to protect competition in this sector.
The reality is that, over a little more than a decade, Facebook has managed to 
connect 2.2 billion people and has built, through messages, photos and likes, one of  
the most extensive repositories of  personal data available. 
Such data are indispensable not only for competition between operators in 
online markets but also for operators active in other sectors.
One of  the issues that the Commission examined before approving Microsoft’s 
acquisition of  LinkedIn in 2016 was whether the combination of  data from both 
companies would cause significant barriers to competition for other operators. In 
this context, the so-called ‘Neo-Brandeis School’ in the United States has advocated 
a broad and pluralistic conception of  the objectives pursued by competition law that 
may incorporate concerns that go beyond strictly efficiency considerations, including 
privacy protection. 
Some national competition authorities in the EU are examining the conduct of  
undertakings relating to the collection and misuse of  data on digital markets under 
an new prism concerning the prohibition of  abuse of  a dominant position.
In this respect, the German competition authority – the Bundeskartellamt – seems 
inclined to consider that Facebook is abusing its dominant position on the German 
social networking market by making use of  its network subject to the possibility of  
collecting data from users generated through the use of  other websites and applications 
such as WhatsApp and Instagram, and to integrate them into one’s Facebook account. 
In this context, and in view of  the less formalist approach in the application 
of  competition law promoted in recent years, as well as the increasingly high fines 
imposed on undertakings, it is more important than ever to emphasize the case-law 
of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “CJEU”, 
“Court of  Justice” or simply “the Court”) according to which the discretion enjoyed by 
the Commission in matters involving complex assessments is not tantamount to a 
“blank check” in favour of  the latter.
Thus, if  the CJEU is not to substitute itself  for the Commission in the analysis 
of  facts and evidence or in defining its political priorities in the field of  competition, 
it is incumbent on it to exercise in depth its powers of  review of  legality and, where 
appropriate, to ensure that the principle of  effective judicial protection enshrined in 
Article 47 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the EU (hereinafter “the Charter” 
16 Commission Decision of  27.6.2017 relating to proceedings under Article 102 of  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of  the European Union and Article 54 of  the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area [AT.39740 - Google Search (Shopping)] - C (2017) 4444 final. 
17 Commission Decision of  18 July 2018, Case AT.40099 – Google Android.
18 See “The next capitalist revolution” The Economist, November 15, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
leaders/2018/11/15/the-next-capitalist-revolution.
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or “the European Charter”) is respected.19 
The Court took an important step towards strengthening judicial control of  
abuses of  a dominant position in its judgment in the Grand Chamber case in Intel of  
September 2017,20 where it annulled for the first time a decision of  the General Court 
of  the European Union (hereinafter “General Court”) concerning the application of  
Article 102 TFEU. 
In that judgment, the Court of  Justice, by rejecting the fundamental premise 
of  the Commission’s decision and the General Court’s ruling according to which it 
was unnecessary to examine all the relevant circumstances of  the case, clarified the 
case-law initiated by Hoffman-La Roche, of  1979,21 and sent a decisive message to the 
European Commission: that it cannot rely on any kind of  “facilitation” when it makes 
use of  presumptions of  abuse to justify an infringement of  Article 102 TFEU.22 
It must be acknowledged that such an evolution in the case-law, supported by 
developments in economic science over the last decades, does not make it easier for 
the competition regulator or the courts to assess the legality of  their acts.23 
IV. Protection of personal data and fundamental rights in the 
digital age
1. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Google 
Spain jurisprudence and the “right to be forgotten”
The GDPR24 is an important step towards restoring or enhancing public 
confidence in the benefits of  digitisation, in particular by promoting greater citizen 
control over the data concerning them.
Article 17 of  the GDPR establishes and regulates what is known as the “right to 
erasure” or the “right to be forgotten”,25 a typical right of  the digital age. It has its origin in 
the judgment of  the Court of  Justice (Grand Chamber) of  2014 in Google Spain,26 the 
first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret a directive in the context 
of  Internet search engines.
It is important to know the main lines of  this case.
The reference for a preliminary ruling was made in the context of  a dispute 
opposing Google Spain and Google Inc (hereinafter referred to as “Google”) to 
19 See, for example, Judgment Schindler Holding e.a./Comissão, case C-501/11 P, of  18 July 2013, 
EU:C:2013:522, paragraphs 36 to 38.
20 Judgment of  6 September 2017, Intel v Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632.
21 Judgment of  13 February, 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche/Comissão, 85/76, EU:C:1979:36. 
22 See, for an analysis of  the Intel jurisprudence in its context, my article: J. L. da Cruz Vilaça, “The 
intensity of  judicial review in complex economic matters - recent competition law judgments of  the Court of  Justice 
of  the EU”, Journal of  Antitrust Enforcement, vol. 6, issue 2 (2018): 1-16, https://academic.oup.com/
antitrust/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jaenfo/jny003/4978137.
23 The digital age gives rise to specific legal challenges of  a particular complexity. For instance, 
when prices are set according to an algorithm that undertakings may claim to be confidential and 
commercially sensitive, assessing the legality of  such practice may become particularly complex. 
24 Regulation 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016, on the 
protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data Protection Regulation) – OJ L 119/1, 4.5.2016. 
Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679.
25 In the French version, “le droit à effacement” or “le droit à l’oubli”.
26 Judgment of  13 May 2014, Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317.
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the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD, hereinafter “the Agency”) and to Mr. 
Costeja González. In 2010, Mr. González filed a complaint against the newspaper 
La Vanguardia and against Google based on the fact that whenever an internet user 
entered his name on Google’s search engine, he would obtain links to two pages of  
La Vanguardia, which contained an announcement of  a real-estate auction connected 
with attachment proceedings for the recovery of  social security debts, on which Mr. 
González’s name was mentioned.
It was the latter’s understanding that the reference to the asset’s attachment 
process, which had been completely resolved several years ago, was no longer relevant 
to the public, and that both La Vanguardia and Google should delete or amend those 
pages. The Agency rejected the complaint in so far as it concerned La Vanguardia, 
on the grounds that the publication of  the information in question was justified on 
grounds of  public interest27 and was therefore legitimate.
On the other hand, the complaint was upheld in so far as it concerned Google. 
The Agency considered that search engine operators were subject to data protection 
legislation and that the disclosure of  personal data to third parties against the will of  
the person concerned was liable to breach that person’s fundamental rights. 
Google brought appeals against that decision before the Audiencia Nacional, 
which referred the questions to the Court of  Justice for a preliminary ruling.
In its judgment the Court drew from several provisions of  Directive 95/4628 
(Articles 6, 12 and 14),29 read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, the 
right to have inadequate, irrelevant or excessive information about a person ceasing 
to appear in the results list when doing a search from the name – the so-called 
“delisting” – without requiring that the inclusion of  information in the results list 
causes or may cause damages to the person in question.
The Court also pointed out that that right prevails in principle not only over the 
economic interest of  the search engine operator but also over the public interest in 
finding that information, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, for example, 
in connection with the role played by that person in public life, which would justify 
a preponderant public interest in having access to the information in question. The 
recognition of  the need to ensure “effective and complete protection of  the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of  natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the 
processing of  personal data”,30 guided the decision of  the Court of  Justice. 
In the Schrems judgment of  2015, the Court made this formula even more 
robust by emphasizing the need to ensure “highest level  of  protection of  those fundamental 
rights and freedoms”.31
 In the Google Spain judgment, the Court stated that “processing of  personal data, 
[…] carried out by the operator of  a search engine is liable to affect significantly the fundamental 
rights to privacy and to the protection of  personal data when the search by means of  that engine is 
carried out on the basis of  an individual’s name, since that processing enables any internet user to 
27 In fact, the publication had been made by order of  the Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs, with 
the aim of  publicizing to the maximum what happened in the sales at public auction.
28 Directive 95/46 of  the European Parliament and the Council, of  24 Oct. 1995, on the protection of  
individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data - OJ 
L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50.
29 Concerning the principles of  data quality, data erasure and blocking rights, as well as the right of  
opposition.
30 See Judgment Google Spain, paragraph 53.
31 Judgment of  6 Oct. 2015 (Grand Chamber), Maximilian Schrems, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650, para. 39.
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obtain through the list of  results a structured overview of  the information relating to that individual 
that can be found on the internet – information which potentially concerns a vast number of  aspects 
of  his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could 
have been only with great difficulty”.32 
The effect of  interference with individual rights “is heightened on account of  
the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which render the 
information contained in such a list of  results ubiquitous”.33
In the meantime, the French Conseil d’État also submitted to the CJEU in 
2017 two requests for a preliminary ruling, which are still pending when presenting 
this paper,34 with a view to clarifying certain aspects of  the “right to be forgotten”, in 
particular, whether this right should be absolute and automatically operate when 
sensitive information is concerned and also what its territorial scope is.35
2. The fight against crime and terrorism, the discretion of the 
legislator and the balancing of interests and rights at stake; the 
judgments in Volker und Markus Schecke and Digital Rights 
Ireland
The obligation to ensure respect for privacy and personal data has already led 
the Court to declare all or part of  important Union legislation to be invalid. That case-
law brings to the surface issues of  a cross-cutting nature, in particular, the “eternal” 
question of  any system of  constitutional justice, namely the interrelationship between 
the discretion of  the legislator and scrutiny by the courts, more precisely, the way in 
which a court of  a constitutional nature must exercise its control while respecting 
the margin of  discretion which is recognized to the legislator in any democracy in 
matters that imply sometimes very complex political, economic and social choices. 
In that context, the principle of  proportionality, which forms part of  the general 
principles of  Union law and is enshrined in Article 52 (1) of  the European Charter, 
has played a leading role in the Court’s findings.
In accordance with settled case-law, such a principle requires that “measures 
adopted by European Union institutions do not exceed the limits of  what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when 
there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and 
the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued”.36
Thus, in 2010, in the Volker und Markus Schecke case,37 the Court held that several 
provisions of  Regulation No. 1290/2005 of  21 June 2005 on the financing of  the 
common agricultural policy and of  Regulation No 259/2008 of  18 March 2008, 
concerning the publication of  information on the beneficiaries of  funds from the 
EAGF38 and the EAFRD,39 in so far as, in respect of  the natural persons receiving aid 
32 Judgment Google Spain, para. 80 (my highlight).
33 Idem, ibidem.
34 Cases C-136/17 e C- 507/17. 
35 See Greg Sterling, “Two major changes potentially coming to EU’s Right to Be Forgotten with global implications”, 
Search Engine Land, May 16, 2017, https://searchengineland.com/two-major-changes-potentially-
coming-eus-right-forgotten-global-implications-275047.
36 Judgment of  22 Jan. 2013 (Grand Chamber), Sky Österreich, C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28, para. 50.
37 Judgment of  9 Nov. 2010 (Grand Chamber), Volker und Markus Schecke, C-92/09 and C-93/09, 
EU:C:2010:662. 
38 European Agricultural Guarantee Fund.
39 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.
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from these funds, those provisions required the publication of  personal data relating 
to any beneficiary, without limitations or distinctions according to relevant criteria, 
such as the periods during which they received such aid, their frequency or the type 
or importance thereof.
In the view of  the Court of  Justice, the Council and the Commission did 
not seek to “strike such a balance between the European Union’s interest in guaranteeing the 
transparency40 of  its acts and ensuring the best use of  public funds, on the one hand, and the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, on the other”.41
Particularly striking in this regard is the judgment in Digital Rights Ireland42 of  
2014, in which the CJEU declared Directive 2006/24,43 on the retention of  data 
generated by electronic communications, invalid in its entirety on grounds of  
infringement of  the European Charter.
Personal data is not, today, only valuable assets for private companies. It is also 
essential information for criminal police agencies and judicial authorities, especially 
in combating organized crime and terrorism. But in the ‘Big Data’ era, the track that 
each of  us leaves in using electronic equipment or social networks and by staying 
connected to the Internet can easily slip into abusive interference in the private 
sphere of  people. 
In the Digital Rights case, the Court examined the obligation under Directive 
2006/24 for electronic communications service providers to retain certain categories 
of  data in order to allow possible access to them by national authorities competent 
for the prosecution of  criminal offenses of  special gravity. 
The Directive did not impose an obligation to collect and retain the content 
of  communications, but only so-called ‘metadata’, necessary to find and identify the 
source and destination of  a communication, to determine its date, time and duration, 
the type of  communication equipment or the location of  mobile communication 
equipment. 
These data include, in particular, the name and address of  the registered 
subscriber or user, the home telephone number and the telephone number of  the 
recipient, as well as an IP address for the Internet services.
Such data permits, inter alia, to identify the person with whom a subscriber or 
a registered user has communicated and through which medium and to determine 
how often the subscriber or the registered user communicates with certain people 
for a certain period.
Although the content of  the communications and the information consulted 
is not concerned, the Court emphasized, that those metadata, “taken as a whole, may 
allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of  the persons whose data has 
been retained, such as the habits of  everyday life, permanent or temporary places of  residence, daily 
or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of  those persons and the social 
environments frequented by them”.44
40 The principle of  transparency in Union law is enshrined in Articles 1 and 10 TEU and 15 TFEU. 
See paragraph 68 of  the judgment.
41 See paragraph 80 of  the judgment.
42 Judgment of  8  April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238.
43 Directive 2006/24 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 March 2006 on the reten-
tion of  data generated or processed in connection with the provision of  publicly available electronic 
communications services or of  public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58 
– OJ L 105, p. 54.
44 See paragraph 27 of  the judgment.
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The Court acknowledged that the data generated by electronic communications 
is an important and useful tool in the fight against crime, in particular, organized 
crime and terrorism, whose effectiveness in protecting the rights to freedom and 
security set out in Article 6 of  the Charter depends on the use of  modern research 
techniques.
It concluded, however, that pursuing this general interest objective did not 
justify the particularly serious interference that Directive 2006/24 entailed in the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter.
The Court thus held that the retention of  data, in the manner laid down in 
Directive 2006/24, was disproportionate in several respects. In particular: 
- the data retention obligation covered virtually the entire European population, 
all electronic means of  communication and all traffic data, even applying to 
persons for whom there was no evidence of  serious crime;
- no exception was made for communications subject to professional secrecy; 
- the Directive did not lay down objective criteria which would limit access 
and use by the competent national authorities to the data necessary to combat 
infringements sufficiently serious to justify the interference caused;
- it was envisaged that the data would be kept for a period of  between 6 and 24 
months, without specifying that the precise determination of  this period should 
be based on objective criteria, in order to ensure that it was limited to what was 
strictly necessary; 
- the Directive did not provide sufficient guarantees against the risks of  abuse 
and access to and unlawful use of  the data retained; 
- nor did it require the data to be stored in the territory of  the Union, with the 
result that it could not be held that the control, required by Article 8(3) of  the 
Charter, by an independent authority of  compliance with the requirements of  
protection and security was fully ensured. 
The motto for this in-depth analysis by the CJEU was set out in paragraph 48 
of  the judgment, where the Court stated that “in view of  the extent and seriousness of  the 
interference [in the fundamental rights at issue] the EU legislature’s discretion is reduced, with the 
result that review of  that discretion should be strict”.
 
3. The weighing of interests: more or less serious interference in 
individual rights; the judgments in Schrems and in Ministerio Fiscal 
The risk of  not ensuring an adequate level of  protection was again assessed 
by the Court in the Schrems judgment of  2015 on the interpretation of  Directive 
95/46,45 in particular, Article 25 on the transfer of  personal data to a third country.46
Here again, the Court ruled in favour of  a strict interpretation of  the conditions 
for the application of  the Directive. The Court stated that “in view of, first, the important 
role played by the protection of  personal data in the light of  the fundamental right to respect for 
private life and, secondly, the large number of  persons whose fundamental rights are liable to be 
infringed where personal data is transferred to a third country not ensuring an adequate level of  
45 Directive 95/46 of  24 October 1995 on the protection of  individuals with regard to the processing 
of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data - OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50.
46 On the judgment, see Fanny Coudert, “Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner: a slap on the wrist for the 
Commission and new powers for data protection authorities”, European Law Blog, October 15, 2015, available on: 
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/10/15/schrems-vs-data-protection-commissioner-a-slap-on-the-
wrist-for-the-commission-and-new-powers-for-data-protection-authorities/.
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protection, the Commission’s discretion as to the adequacy of  the level of  protection ensured by a 
third country is reduced, with the result that review of  the requirements stemming from Article 25 
of  Directive 95/46, read in the light of  the Charter, should be strict”.47
The dispute opposed Maximilian Schrems, a young and active Austrian citizen, 
of  Facebook, and the Data Protection Commissioner of  Ireland. The case was 
predicated on the latter’s refusal to investigate a complaint that Facebook Ireland 
transferred the personal information of  its users to the United States and stored 
them on servers located in that country. 
Max Schrems relied in particular on the revelations made by Edward Snowden 
on the activities of  the United States Information Services, namely the National 
Security Agency (NSA).
For its part, the Data Protection Commissioner argued it was covered by the 
Commission Decision 2000/520,48 in which the Commission considered that the 
United States provided an adequate level of  protection.
The Court concluded that that decision, which was based on the existence of  
a Safe Harbour mechanism, itself  based on the self-certification by US companies of  
compliance with certain principles, was invalid in that: 
- the Commission did not ensure that the United States would effectively 
guarantee an adequate level of  protection;49 
- the Commission’s decision deprives the national supervisory authorities of  
the powers conferred on them by Directive 95/46 to examine, with complete 
independence, any request relating to the protection of  the rights and freedoms 
of  a person with regard to the processing of  his personal data.50
It remains to be said that the balancing of  the interests involved in relation to 
the objectives and the relative gravity of  the interference does not always lead to the 
same kind of  conclusions.
Thus, in October 2018, in the case Ministerio Fiscal, concerning the interpretation 
of  Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic communications,51 in conjunction 
with Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, the CJEU validated the access by Spanish 
judicial police for a limited period of  time to personal data held by electronic 
communications service providers with a view to identifying SIM card holders 
activated on a stolen mobile phone, such as their surname, forename and, where 
appropriate, their address.52
While admitting that such access constituted an interference with the fundamental 
rights of  the right holders laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, the Court 
held that, in those circumstances, interference was not such as to prevent access for 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offenses, in such 
a way that it would be limited to the fight against serious crime. 
47 Judgment, paragraph 78. 
48 Commission Decision 2000/520 of  26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the level of  
protection afforded by the Safe Harbour Principles and the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 
issued by the Department of  Commerce of  the United States of  America - OJ 1994 L 215, p. 7.
49 See paragraphs 97 and 98 of  the judgment.
50 Paragraph 99 to 106 of  the judgment.
51 Directive 2002/58 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of  personal data and the protection of  privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications - E-privacy directive), OJ L 201, 31/07/2002, 
p. 37-47.
52  See paragraphs 48 and ff. of  the judgment.
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The data at issue did not allow for precise conclusions to be drawn as to the 
private life of  individuals and, therefore, access to those data could not be classified 
as a ‘serious interference’ with the fundamental rights of  the persons concerned.
It was not therefore a situation identical to that which had been examined by 
the Court in Digital Rights Ireland and in the judgment of  2016 in Tele2 Sverige and 
Watson,53/54 where the ECJ ruled on the implications for Member States’ legislations 
of  that first judgment. These were ‘serious’ interferences which, in accordance with 
the principle of  proportionality, could only be justified in terms of  prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offenses, with a view to 
combating ‘serious’ crime.
The Court nevertheless stated in the latter judgment that Member States may 
adopt rules enabling, in a preventive way, a selective conservation of  traffic and location 
data for the purpose of  combating serious crime, provided that it “is limited, with respect 
to the categories of  data to be retained, the means of  communication affected, the persons concerned 
and the retention period adopted, to what is strictly necessary”,55 that access by the competent 
authorities is subject to prior checking by a court or an independent administrative 
authority and that the data in question are kept in the territory of  the Union.
From the case-law referred so far, it is possible to draw two main inferences:
- First, that a careful assessment of  each particular situation must be carried out, 
taking into account the seriousness of  both the interference with fundamental 
rights and the infringement under investigation; 
- Second, that the Court’s scrutiny tends to be more intense when it comes to 
seeking an appropriate balance between individual rights and freedoms, on the 
one hand, and public order and security requirements, on the other hand, even 
more so as these are likely to involve the preservation of  rights as fundamental 
as the right to life and physical integrity.
This development of  the case-law can contribute not only to transforming the 
relationship between the Union legislature and the CJEU, but also to bring the latter 
closer to a real constitutional court, more focused on protecting fundamental rights 
and preserving checks and balances than on achieving the objective of  the internal 
market.
In any case, as someone has already noted, “[t]here is a symbolic dimension to the fact 
that the strict scrutiny was first applied to the right to privacy: ‘the’ human right in the information 
age”.56 I have no doubt that the digital age will continue to confront the Union’s 
courts with new challenges and opportunities, due to the profound impact it is 
already having on the evolution of  modern societies.
53 Judgment of  21 Dec. 2016, Tele2 Sverige and Tom Watson, C-203/15 and C-698/15, EU:C:2016:970, 
available on: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=186492&pageInde-
x=0&doclang=pt&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5907371.
54 On this judgment, see Orla Lynskey, “Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson: continuity and radical change”, 
European Law Blog, January 12, 2017.
55 See paragraph 108 of  the judgment.
56 M. P. Granger and K. Irion, “The Court of  Justice and The Data Retention Directive in Digital 
Rights Ireland: Telling Off  The EU Legislator and Teaching a Lesson in Privacy and Data Protection,” 
European Law Review, vol. 39, issue 6 (2014): 835-850, http://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=66f958db-
8cb6-4c2c-b58f-827af88824b3. 
